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GREENE v. GEORGIA
117 S. Ct. 578 (1996)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Daniel Greene was convicted of murder, armed robbery, and
aggravated assault and sentenced to death. Over the defendant's objec-
tions at trial, the court excused for cause five jurors who expressed
reservations about the death penalty.1 The Supreme Court of Georgia
affirmed Greene's death sentence, and cited Wainwright v. Witt2 as
"'controlling authority' for a rule that appellate courts must defer to trial
courts' findings concerning juror bias."'3 Greene petitioned for certio-
rari, arguing that a state appellate court is not bound by the Witt standard
of review when evaluating the dismissal of jurors for cause.
4
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, holding that
(I) Witt governed the determination of when ajuror may be excused for
cause because of his views on the death penalty,5 but that (2) the Witt
standard of review, whereby federal habeas courts must accord a
presumption of correctness to state courts' findings of juror bias, did not
govern the standard of review to be applied by state appellate courts
reviewing trial courts' rulings on jury selection.
6
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
In holding that Witt was not controlling as to the standard for state
appellate review of trial courts' rulings on jury selection, the Court
further stated that "[tlhe Supreme Court of Georgia is free to adopt the
rule laid down in Witt... but it need not do so."7
It is difficult to ascertain whether the Supreme Court of Virginia
sees itself bound by the presumption of correctness accorded by Witt
I Greene v. Georgia, 117 S. Ct. 578 (1996).
2469 U.S. 412 (1985).
3 Greene, 117 S. Ct. at 578.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 578-79. The Witt standard for determining whether a juror
may be removed for cause because of his views on the death penalty is
whether those views would "'prevent or substantially impair the perfor-
mance of his duties as ajuror in accordance with his instructions and his
oath."' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424 (citation omitted).
6 Greene, 117 S. Ct. at 579.
7 Id. at 579. Note that Witt arose on federal habeas, where deference
to state court findings is mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
8 225 Va. 564, 304 S.E.2d 644 (1983).
with regard to trial court decisions on jury selection, or whether it has
even chosen to adopt the Witt standard of review. For example, in a pre-
Witt decision, LeVasseur v. Commonwealth,8 the Supreme Court of
Virginia stated, "The trial judge must satisfy himself that the juror's
commitment against the death penalty is 'unmistakably clear.' This
finding of fact cannot be disturbed on appeal unless we can say, upon
consideration of the voir dire as a whole, that it was erroneous."9
However, in post-Witt decisions, the Supreme Court of Virginia has
stated that "[a]s an appellate court, we must give deference to the trial
court's decision whether to retain or exclude individual veniremen
because the trial court 'sees and hears the juror."' 10 This rule quotes a
portion of Witt's language. The court has also cited Witt for the proposi-
tion that "[d]eference must be paid to trial judges in deciding which juror
will be unable to apply the law faithfully and impartially." 11 However,
the court has also consistently stated that the trial court's findings as to
juror bias "will not be disturbed on appeal unless manifest error
exists." 12 If Virginia appellate courts must give deference to trial court
findings on juror bias, the Supreme Court of Virginia has not stated
whether that decision was an independent one, or whether it believes Witt
requires such deference.
Because a clear cut position on the applicability of Witt is lacking,
appellate defense counsel in Virginia may use Greene to argue that, with
regard to trial court rulings on juror bias, the Virginia state courts are not
bound by the standard of review as announced in Witt. State appellate
courts need not defer to trial court rulings on juror bias; rather, they may
review the record as a whole and make an independent determination as
to juror bias.
Summary and analysis by:
Lisa M. Jenio
9 LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 584, 304 S.E.2d at 655 (emphasis added).
See also Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455,248 S.E.2d 135 (1978).
10 Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236,246,397 S.E.2d 385,391
(1990) (emphasis added). See also Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va.
563,572,385 S.E.2d 850,855 (1989); Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 250
Va. 379, 386,464 S.E.2d 131, 136 (1995).
It Bennett v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 448, 469, 374 S.E.2d 303,
316 (1988).
12 Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313,339,356 S.E.2d 157, 171
(1987) (emphasis added). See also O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va.
672,693,364 S.E.2d 491,503 (1988); Eaton, 240 Va. at 246,397 S.E.2d
at 391; Bennett, 236 Va. at 469, 374 S.E.2d at316; and Sheppard, 250 Va.
at 386, 464 S.E.2d at 136.
